Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Evil? No Problem
In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?
Friday, November 4, 2011
The Principle of Sufficent Reason: No Brute Facts?
You are hiking in a remote wilderness, miles from the nearest building or even cell phone tower. You come upon a clearing and see a crystal sphere hovering over you and emitting colorful light pulses in some seeming order: red, blue, green and the pattern repeats. Should there be an explanation for this odd phenomenon or is it acceptable to shrug our shoulders and mutter "Stuff happens"? Can we extrapolate from this case to a general principle of the universe? If so, can we prove that God (or a reasonable facsimile) exists?
The Relevance of the Origin of Species
One important scientific development unavailable to David Hume or any of his fictional interlocutors is the theory of evolution. For many people today, both theists and atheists, religious believers, scientists and intellectuals, the truth of evolution is bound up with the truth of theism. So what is the significance of evolution for the design argument? Does is it provide evidence for either side of the debate? On this 152st anniversary of the publication of Darwin's seminal Origin of Species, it is fitting to ask: where might a discussion of Darwin have fit into Hume's Dialogues?
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Analogies and Disanalogies
Cleanthes argues that the universe is like a machine and hence likely designed by intelligent creator. Philo, on the other hand, proposes that it is equally probable that the universe is like an animal or vegetable and the order in the universe may be the result of generation, vegetation, or instinct. He even suggests that chance could produce our universe. Who is right? Given the order and seeming purpose to the universe, what is the most likely explanation? Or are none of them more likely than the other (and hence agnosticism the only rational position)?
Friday, October 28, 2011
God -- or Some Lesser Designer
In Chapter V, Philo devises several arguments that accept that the universe has a designer, but deny that that designer is God. Given our traditional definition that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, is Philo correct? Or is there a response to his arguments? Does it matter if the designer is the traditional God?
Thursday, October 20, 2011
MacBeth's Dagger and Other Illusions
Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?
Monday, October 17, 2011
Who Needs God?
Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?
Much Ado About a Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
Sunday, October 9, 2011
Saturday, October 8, 2011
A Noble Failure?
Many of us in class found Descartes' foundational project to fail. Let's assume that he cannot justify all his claims to knowledge by an appeal to the Cogito. What can we learn from this failure? Should we look for a wider class of foundational beliefs? Should we avoid appeals to a God who is not a deceiver? Should we find a different way to justify beliefs that does not require an appeal to foundational beliefs?
The Role of God
Descartes attempts to prove God's existence in Meditation III in order to rule out the possibility of an evil genius and to ensure that everything he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true is in fact true. Without discussing the merits of the argument (which we only summarized in class), discuss the role of the existence of God in Descartes' project. Assuming he can prove God's existence, can God guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas? Can God guarantee sense perception? Is it wise that God plays such a prominent role in his project?
Monday, October 3, 2011
The Cogito
In Meditation II, Descartes believes he has both defeated skepticism and discovered a foundational belief that he will use to justify all his other claims to knowledge. He argues that the very act of doubt proves that he exists. Is he right? Does the Cogito disprove skepticism? Even if it does is it a Pyrrhic victory -- or can this belief be the basis for the rest of his knowledge?
When the Walls Come Tumbling Down
Descartes realizes that some of the beliefs he thought were true turned out to be false. In the pursuit of knowledge he seeks to tear down his previous beliefs and build them up again upon a firm foundation. In other words, he is engaged in a foundational project, searching for a class of beliefs that themselves are not in need of justification in order to justify his other beliefs. But is this quest a misguided one? Do such beliefs exist? If not, does that mean that knowledge is impossible? Or is there some other way to justify our beliefs
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
Plato's Cave
Plato argues that most of us are like prisoners in a cave who are bound in such a way that we can only see shadows of objects projected on a wall. Not only can we not see the objects that cast the shadows, we cannot even see the objects outside of the cave. A more modern analogy might have the prisoner's watching a movie or perhaps "plugged in" to a virtual reality program. What is Plato claiming about the ordinary person? What is our epistemic state? Do we have any hope in escaping? And most importantly, is Plato correct? In short, what is your interpretation of Plato's allegory of the cave and is the allegory the correct way to view the human quest for knowledge?
Saturday, September 10, 2011
Expertise or Popularity?
Plato criticizes democracy throughout The Republic. In Chapter 8, for example, he compares the state to a ship. He argues that it is better to have a captain knowledgeable about navigation steer the ship rather than untrained crewmembers. The crewmembers may be able to persuade the owners to let them sail the ship, but without the proper expertise, the ship will not reach its destination. In other words, Plato argues that democracy rewards popularity over expertise, but it is expertise that is essential for good government. Is he right? Consider some examples from class. Can democracy deal with such long-term issues as global warming when most people would prefer to ignore them? Can it deal with economic recovery when most citizens don't understand economic theory? Or can you give a point in democracy's favor?
Monday, September 5, 2011
Hasta La Vista Homer!
As Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger used arguments similar to Plato's in The Republic to restrict the use of violent video games for minors. Even though the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, is such a law morally justified? Examining ONE of Plato's arguments. Can a case be made to prohibit video games? Or is the argument flawed or not applicable to video games? Is there any form of entertainment that should be kept out of a teenager's hands (or minds)?
The Challenge of the Ring of Gyges
In Chapter 2 of the The Republic Glaucon, the brother of Plato, challenged Socrates to provide a reason to act morally even when immorality appeared more profitable. He related the story of the ring of Gyges, a ring which gives the wearer invisibility and hence preserves his (or her ) anonymity in committing the most egregious of crimes. Such a person may maintain his reputation for good while stealing, pillaging and seducing at will.
Is such a challenge asking too much? Is the only way to provide a valid reason to act morally an appeal to virtue as its own reward, without any consideration of the external benefits? Is it enough that morality is more profitable than immorality MOST of the time, even if not in the wildly implausible thought experiment of the Ring of Gyges?
Is such a challenge asking too much? Is the only way to provide a valid reason to act morally an appeal to virtue as its own reward, without any consideration of the external benefits? Is it enough that morality is more profitable than immorality MOST of the time, even if not in the wildly implausible thought experiment of the Ring of Gyges?
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