Monday, October 17, 2011
Much Ado About a Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
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Berkley's argument on size rests on the fact that, from different perspectives, we can say that the mite's foot is either gigantic or small. Since no object can be two conflicting things at once, the size of things must exist within our minds. This theory applies to all types of perception. Nothing has primary qualities, since everything appears differently from opposing perspectives.
ReplyDeleteThe problem with Berkley's argument is that he does not consider measurable dimensions or absolute size at all. The mite's foot can be big or small, but it will always have the same dimensions, and those dimensions can be measured. For example, the foot of the mite could measure half a meter (for a very large mite) and that measurement will never change no matter what perspective the foot is seen from. This observation could be taken to other material objects. Burning heat from a fire is indeed a sensation, but the exact amount of heat energy that the fire releases can also be measured in a way that it is the same for all perspectives. We can also find the absolute amplitude of a sound wave even though two people might hear the sound wave differently. Just about everything that Barkley mentions has a primary quality that either could have been observed during his time or was impossible to measure then, but can be measured now. There are so many examples of clear primary qualities that Berkley's idealism has to be false.
Berkeley discussesthe size of a mite’s foot as seen from different perspectives in his argument regarding size and perception. In this argument he expresses that the size of the mite's foot is relative to the perceiver. This is because the mite’s foot appears both small and large (depending on your perspective). He then continues by stating that an object cannot have contradicting or incompatible qualities. Therefore, an object is unable to be both small and large. He concludes that, size is thus not inherent in the object, but in the mind of the perceiver. This argument is consistent with Berkeley’s core belief of Idealism, the belief that the only things that exist are in the mind and ideas.
ReplyDeleteI believe that this argument is successful. Feeling slightly unnerved by the idea that there are no inherent qualities found in any objects, I desperately tried to think of a perception that could apply to an object without being able to be perceived differently from a different perspective. However, I could not think of a single example. Berkeley’s argument is successful because there is no objective force to determine the inherent qualities of an object, and thus all qualities are simply perceptions by the perceiver. There is not a single quality of any object that every single organism on earth could reach a consensus on, and thus all qualities are relative to the perceiver and Berkeley is correct.
In class, we discussed Berkeley's argument for idealism from perception, and came to the conclusion that size is not in the object but in the mind of the perceiver. Like Robert said, this conclusion is based off of the argument that no object can have two conflicting or incompatible qualities. I agree with Robert that Berkeley's argument is flawed. While it is true that everyone has a different perception of size, that doesn't mean that an object's dimensions change based on a person's perception of it. An object will always have primary qualities that can't be changed by perception, and perception is always based off of something else. For example, I would perceive a person that is 5'5" to be short , but a 5 year old might perceive that person to be tall. Just because I perceived him as short doesn't make him shorter, and just because the 5 year old perceived him as tall doesn't make him taller. An object will always have primary qualities that will never change, no matter what we perceive them to be. Therefore, Berkeley's idealism must be false.
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ReplyDeleteThe argument that Berkeley makes regarding the size of a mite’s foot is based solely on the notion of perception. He argues that the size of the mite’s foot, or any object, is in the eyes of the perceiver. To a human such as ourselves, a mite’s foot appears incredibly small, however, to something smaller than a mite (I don’t know that anything of such nature exists), the foot appears huge. Berkeley then goes on to claim that an object cannot have contradicting and incompatible qualities, such as hot and cold, or large and small. Subsequently, Berkeley makes a valid claim that size is not inherent in the object, or mite’s foot, rather, size is relative to the perceiver.
ReplyDeleteOne visible objection one might have is that perceptions such as small and large are deceiving. These traits may be an illusion and deceiving, after all we have discussed that only one of these contradicting traits can be true while the other is false.
However, I believe that this argument is successful in the fact that Berkeley makes it clear that nothing has primary qualities because in this argument, he establishes the notion that the perceiver creates all traits. Take two people as an example, both of which stick their hands under the same sink consisting of a constant stream of hot water. Some people feel hot water and scald their hands, however others may perceive the water to be cold. This is because of the sensors and nerves in our bodies that register hot and cold, and other such traits. While people intuitively believe that the water will be hot, and it feels that way to some, others feel cold water for a few seconds in response to the nerves that respond to cold water sending messages to the brain. Thus, Berkeley’s argument is valid because while the water comes out of the spout hot, some perceive it as hot, while others perceive it as cold. Therefore, it is clear that traits are not inherent in the object, but rather exist in the mind of the perceiver.
The perception of something regardless of its size is in the eyes of the beholder. We can all agree that the size of a mite's foot is pretty minuscule, yet to a bacteria or other microscopic organism this foot would be a gigantic presence. I believe that this concept of different minds perceiving things in terms of various sizes does not hold truth. Even though we may perceive something as small or big that something does have a set amount of dimensions. Its size has a definite limit, and it is an entity that can be measured and proven. The notion that size can be simply thought up in the mind displays a lack of reality in this sense.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley believes that our different perceptions can prove the belief of idealism. If we look at the example of a mite, everyone will agree that the animal is extremely tiny, however if we were to compare our perception to that of a microscopic being or something else smaller than the mite, we would have conflicting views because the other being would see the mite as extremely large. Berkeley argues that because objects cannot have contradictory qualities such as large and small, the qualities (and mite) must be ideas in the mind, therefore idealism.
ReplyDeleteAt first glance, this seems like a very convincing argument for idealism, but there are several problems that arise from such a claim. One could argue that if everything was an idea based on our perceptions, why can’t a change in an idea in the observers mind change reality, why are dreams any different than reality, or any other illogical conclusion that arises. Since there are problems and the outcome of this idea does not match our reality, the original idea must be flawed in some way. In Berkeley’s argument he believes that conflicting perceptions leads to a world without material objects, but I believe that Berkeley incorrectly defines and incorrectly uses perceptions in his argument. Firstly, as many others have mentioned there are set standards that can be applied to any object to discern certain qualities about the object. Whether we say a mite is 1 centimeter or .4 inches or any other equivalent statement, this would define the mite with a definite size. Also, this size does not change if it is measured by a human or a microscopic organism; the size is the same either way. If these universal dimensions are used instead of individual perceptions the conflict of two different inherent qualities is removed, and consequently, so is idealism. This new argument does not get rid of perception, but instead demotes it from determining the primary qualities to how a specific object (a mite) is viewed from a certain reference point (human/microscopic organism).
Berkley’s argument about the mite’s foot is one based on perception. From different perspectives you can either argue that the mite’s foot is humongous or tiny. As Berkley stated earlier, no objects, with any forms of perception, can be two conflicting behaviors at the same exact time. Therefore, the size of the mite’s foot must be only existent within our minds, and no objects that we perceive have any primary qualities as everything we perceive has other views as well.
ReplyDeleteBerkley’s main problem with his idealism argument is that he doesn’t consider set measurements (inches, centimeters, miles). For example, the mite’s foot can be viewed as huge for an insect much smaller than the mite, but at the same time for a human being, the mite’s foot is tiny. Yet, during both scenarios, the mite’s foot will always be a set distance. This doesn’t only relate to the distance of the mite’s foot, it could also relate to other things, such as how cold it is outside. For someone who is from Sudan, 40 degrees might be considered very cold, yet, for someone who is from Antarctica 40 degrees could be considered warm. In both scenarios the temperature stays the same and therefore the temperature has a primary quality, which all people can clearly state, in this case, is 40 degrees. Ultimately, proving Berkley’s theory of idealism, that everything on earth has only secondary qualities, as being completely wrong.
The argument that Berkeley makes concerning the relativity of perception is as follows; 1) Perception is relative to the perceiver, 2) The mite’s foot appears both teenie weenie and ginormous, 3) An object cannot have incompatible qualities, 4) An object cannot be both teenie weenie and ginormous, and 5) Size is not in the object but in the mind. This argument is a successful argument because it flows logically, but, in terms of it being an argument that I agree with it most certainly is not. Size is not merely existent in the mind because although it may be relative to the perceiver, something that is small is just undoubtedly small and something that is large is just undoubtedly large. For example, if you took the smallest particle known to man (I know not what it is) but one could not deny that it is small because it is, in fact, the smallest thing on earth. Now the same thing could also be said for the largest thing on earth in terms of size, (once again, I don’t know what it is), but one could not say that that object is small because it simply isn’t. So in the case of the mite, yes the mite might be big in terms of another organism, but that simply makes that organism smaller than the mite and the mite still remains small.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Berkeley, there are only secondary qualities, that is to say, the only things that exist are minds and ideas. Thus all qualities are not in the object but in the mind. Berkeley uses the mite scenario to illustrate this belief. The mite will see his own foot as ginormous but a person looking down on the mite will see the mite's foot as tiny. This difference in size illustrates Berkeley's first premise; perception of size is relative to perceiver because the mite sees the same thing as the man but the object itself appears to have different sizes. The second premise thus is the foot appears both small and ginormous. Thirdly, an object cannot have contradictory or incompatible qualities (such as being both small and large at the same time). Finally, because the foot cannot be both tiny and ginormous, the perception of size must be in the mind because the foot has both contradictory qualities. The only way for both qualities to exist is if the qualities are in the mind. While Berkeley's argument is strong, there are some issues to it. Berkeley assumes that because an object cannot have two contradictory qualities, an object cannot have either quality. However, Berkeley overlooks that an object can still have one of the contradictory qualities. In other words, just because the foot of the mite cannot be both big and small does not mean the foot can be either big or small. Nonetheless, Berkeley would argue that if the object only has one quality, then the other quality must be a deception. The object cannot be both large and small, so assume the object is large. Then the human who perceives the mite's foot is wrong about the size of the object because he see's the foot as small. There is no way to tell if you are being deceived by the qualities or not because a perception cannot be false.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley’s example of the Mite’s foot as well as all of the products of the sense, (taste, sight, smell, sound, and touch,) to show that none of these are inherent qualities of things that we think reside in our universe and because those are the only tools we have to determining what does and does not exist, nothing that we think exists because we sense them actually exists. The problem that arises with this argument, which we as a class dealt with fairly early on, was the distinction Berkeley does not make clearly that those products of the senses are different than the physical measurement of the qualities that they seem to be linked to. The sensation of warmth is different than the rapid movement of molecules to create higher amounts of energy; sound waves caused by kinetic energy are different than sounds that you hear; taste is different than the chemical makeup of the food that you are eating etc. At first, the definition of size doesn’t seem to be apart of this family of distinctions but Berkeley soon proves that it is. His argument is that although a Mite’s foot will always have the same amount of centimeters from tip to tip, its “size” is relative. When looking at it from the perspective of a human the foot is minuscule; when looking at it from the perspective of a mite, the foot is normal size; and when looking at it from an organism smaller than a mite the foot looks huge. Since all three of those perspectives can exist simultaneously, (each seeing that the same mite foot has different sizes,) the quality of size does not pass the test of “true essence” which is that something cannot have contradicting qualities. If size was real and not just a perception of the mind, than each of the organisms: humans, mites, and microorganisms would say that the mite foot has the same size.
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